Purpose: Within the process of project-based supply chain inter-organizational cooperative innovation, the achievement of project value-adding has been influenced by many factors like the effect level of project-based organization and the relationship within project cooperative innovation objectives etc. The purpose of this paper is to provide a reliable reference for the contractor reasonably allocate the effect level and resources between the knowledge investment and knowledge innovation stage, and realize the knowledge collaboration for project-based supply chain.
going on, which is the best approach for making project-based supply chains with more valueadding (Waroonkun & Stewart, 2008) . As the original drive for innovation, knowledge is an essential factor in maintaining core competence of project-based supply chain, which cannot be replaced in the appreciation of project value (Demaid & Quintas, 2006; Wu, 2011a) . Supply chains provide good environment for the transfer, assimilation, conversion and economization of knowledge, given which condition project-based organizations can consciously and voluntarily offer core knowledge according to project knowledge requirement (Yim & Kim, 2004) . Therefore, the imperative problem now is how to establish the knowledge collaborative incentive mechanisms among project-based organizations. For project-based organizations, knowledge is the most valuable assets and effective knowledge configuration underpins the core process of the organizations because knowledge covers the best practice, operation and management, organization and learning, problem solving and process creation, which are hardly duplicated (Ribeiro, 2005; Renzel, 2008; Kodama, 2005) . However, due to the discreteness of the construction industry and the characteristics of the temporality and dynamics of project cooperation, it is a considerable challenge to realize the interorganizational collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains (Argote, 2000) . Despite the challenge, considering the significant role of knowledge for project success, more and more project-based organizations expect to draw the support of the outer resources so as to enhance their capability of converting collaborative knowledge into core competence (Sammaddar, 2006) . In regard to this problem, this paper employs the work of Mohamed and Anumba (2010) and introduces the concept of knowledge flow into project-based supply chains. We define knowledge management as process conversion in which the operation environment inside organizations are set as input, the knowledge flow are divided into knowledge investment, knowledge assimilation, knowledge transmission and knowledge innovation, and suppose that project-based organizations can obtain interests from the collaborative innovation. (Wu, 2011b) . Therefore, this paper selects the steadiness of knowledge investment and the balance of knowledge innovation as the two control objectives for realizing project values adding from a panoramic view of project values adding. Considering the alternative of effort-cost between knowledge investment and knowledge innovation, this paper examined the effects of inter-organizational knowledge collaboration on project values adding by means of adjusting the incentive intensity in the process of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation as coordinating method.
Model Introduction and Solution

Model Introduction
To simplify the analysis, here we take owners as dominant enterprises and study how they implement inter-organizational collaborative innovation with contractors. In the processes of inter-organizational collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains, owners hold the absolute control and leadership that the other project-based organizations such as contractors and raw materials suppliers have to assign the knowledge division and cooperation based on the needs of owners. Under this circumstance, How the owners and contractors achieve supply chain inter-organizational collaborative innovation value adding through knowledge investment and knowledge innovation becomes the key considering problem. As referred above, the processes of the inter-organizational collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains mainly consist of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation. Here we assume contractors alone complete all knowledge investment and knowledge innovation, while owners take charge of supervising contractors' work. Through the efforts made by contractors, the knowledge cooperation of the supply chain inter-organizational collaborative innovation is expected to be reached, and finally project values can be achieved.
We first make several basic assumptions as below: (1) 
where k is the marginal cost substitution rate of contractors' efforts in knowledge investment stage and knowledge innovation stage, which shows the impacts on marginal cost of one stage caused by increase of effort level of the other stages. Since
, we assume -1<k<1; 
Where ϖ is the fixed compensation for contractors and is assumed as a constant; β 1 and β2 are marginal incentive intensity provided by project management enterprises for contractors due to the later' effort in knowledge investment and knowledge innovation, respectively. Based on the above assumptions, contractors' net current incomes expectation utility can be summarized as follows: Project management enterprises' net present value incomes expectation utility can be formulated:
Then, the expectation utility of project values added is:
Under the background of asymmetric information, in order to maximize the utility function of project values added, the project management enterprises' collaborative incentive policy making would be determined by a, β and k together on contractors' knowledge investment and knowledge innovation:
Model Solution
We can have two stages to analyze the processes of inter-organizational collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains,. At the first stage, owners decide the incentive amplitude β1 and β2 to encourage the contractors on knowledge investment and knowledge innovation. At the second stage, with scenario of given β1 and β2, the contractors determine their effort level of a1
and a2 in knowledge investment and knowledge innovation. Therefore, by the method of inverse solution, the first order condition of the synergetic knowledge incentives of inter-organizational collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains is given as below:
Substitute Equation (2) and (3) in Equation (4) and calculate their derivatives respectively.
Then, according to Equation (8) we get:
Equation (9) can be solved easily:
(1 )
It can be found from Equation (10) that contractors' effort level of either knowledge investment or knowledge innovation is affected not only by the incentive amplitude at its own stage, but also affected at the other stage. Substitute Equation (1), (2), (9) in Equation (6), accordance with Equation (7), we've found that the first order condition of the synergetic knowledge incentives of inter-organizational collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains after optimization is: 3 2  2  2  1  2  1  1  1  2  1  2 4  2 2 2 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1 2  1  2   2  3  2  2  2  2  1  2  2  2  1  2  2 4  2 2 2 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1 2 1 2
and the second order condition of the synergetic knowledge incentives of inter-organizational collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains after optimization will be:
Additionally, we have Equation (14):
(1 ) 2 0 ( )
Equation (15) 
Substitute Equation (16) in Equation (10), and the optimal effort level contractors on given synergetic knowledge investment and knowledge innovation will be obtained: 2 2 2 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1 2  1  2   2  2 2  *  2  2  1  2  1  2  2  2  2 4  2 2 2 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1 2 1 2
Model Analysis and Discussion
Result 1. When k≠0, there exists a linear relation between project management enterprises' optimal marginal incentive amplitude and contractors' optimal effort level on synergetic knowledge investment and knowledge innovation. When -1<k<0, βi will increase as k goes up, which means knowledge investment and knowledge innovation are correlated in terms of cost complementation, namely, an increase of incentive amplitude at one of the two stages will boost contractors' effort level at that stage, but diminish that at the other stage. When 0<k<1, βi will decrease as k goes up, which means knowledge investment and knowledge innovation are correlated in terms of cost alternatives, herein, when raising incentive amplitude at either stage will lift contractors effort level at both stages. When k=0, the effort cost of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation is independent respectively and no any impact to the effort level at the other stage if the incentive amplitude at one stage is enhanced.
Proof: the partial derivative of ai in Equation (9): Take -1<k<0 and 0<k<1 substitute in the above equations, and result 1 will be proved. Take the partial derivative of ai in Equation (6)
(1 ) 0
Substitute Equation (16) and Equation (17) in the above equations, then
The second order partial derivative of ai shows below: 
Proof:
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Result 5. When the knowledge collaborative innovation of project-based supply chains keep consistence, project management enterprises' marginal incentive amplitude is decided by contractors' effort level at just one stage, but also at the other stage. Suppose contractors' effort level at one stage increases (i.e. A1 and A2 get bigger), then if -1<k<0, project management enterprises' incentive amplitude increases too; if 0<k<1, project management enterprises' incentive amplitude decreases; if k=0, the output efficiency of the objectives is independent respectively. Hence the increase of output efficiency of the control objective has no effect on the incentive amplitude of the other objective.
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Substitute -1<k<0 and 0<k<1 in above equations and the result can be proved.
Model Simulation and Case Review
Since contractors' fixed compensation ϖ makes no impact on project management enterprises' incentives or contractors' effort level, we assume that ϖ = 0. Therefore, the problem we consider here is how to maximize the interest of both project enterprises and contractors when project-based supply chains add values after the cooperation. Based on model assumptions, we define measurable variable x1 as contractors' level of participation in knowledge synergism, (1) Relationship between the effort level of knowledge investment and knowledge innovation and project values added Substitute Equation (9) in Equation (6) and make k as -0.5, 0, and 0.5 respectively, we will get three different equations of U(a1, a2) as follows: Substitute Equation (9) and related parameters in Equation (6) and make k as -0.5, 0 and 0.5, we will obtain three different equations of U(a1, a2): According to Equation (1), (2), and (6), along with the related parameters, we designated k with -0.5, 0, and 0,5, omitting the influence of contractors' risk discount, we deduce the equations of R(a1, a2) and C(a1, a2) respectively as follows: chains, contractors virtually hold higher risk than project management enterprises, which makes contractors get more willing to implement knowledge investment and knowledge innovation collaborative incentive to realize knowledge synergism. Under this circumstance, the incomes of both cooperation parties will increase in different level.
Conclusion
This Therefore, the inter-organizational bi-lateral incentive of project-based supply chains under knowledge investment and knowledge innovation synergism will be our next key research area to raise project values added further.
